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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----------------
-------------------------
STATE OF UTAH in the 
interest of 
JACKSON, Rose Marie (01-16-68): 
JACKSON, Harold Pratt (11-11-72): 
JACKSON, Dollie Ann (07-31-74): 
Persons under eighteen years 
of age 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case no. 15386 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the termination of the parental 
rights of Marvin and Ruby Jackson as to Rose, Harold, and 
Dollie Jackson, and the provision for continuing contact 
between Rose and her natural parents subsequent to such 
termination. Parental rights as to a fourth child, Carol, 
were also at issue in the trial court, but are not an 
issue in this appeal as said rights were not terminated 
by the juvenile court. Termination was sought pursuant 
to Section 78-3a-48, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), 
for the reason that the parents are unfit or incompetent 
by reason of conduct, or condition which is seriously 
detrimental to the children. 
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DISPOSI'riO'J IN T!IS JUVENILE COURT 
The Second District Juvenile Court, the Honorable 
Judith \vhi tmer presiding, after a trial before said Court, 
entered an order placing the child Carol in foster care 
and denying the petition for permanent deprivation. The 
court ordered the termination of parental rights with 
regard to Rose, Harold, and Dollie Jackson, but provided 
in the case of Rose for limited contact with her natural 
parents should she desire it. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent State of Utah asks that the order 
of the Juvenile Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent disagrees and takes exception to 
the Statement of Fact made by Appellants in the foll01-1ing 
particulars. 
l. Appellant states on page 2 in paragraph 2 
of their Brief that counsel for the parents (Appellants) 
objected to psychological examinations of themselves at 
a hearing on March 8, 1977. In fact Appellants were not 
represented by counsel on March 8 and no objection as to 
said proposed psychologicals was made on their behalf 
at said hearing. (R. pg. 3). 
-2-
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2. Appellants state on page 2 in paragraph 3 
of their Brief that at a hearing held on March 17, 1977, 
the parents (Appellants) objected to the State's motion 
for psychologicals except as to the completion of 
?sychologicals allready commenced by Dr. Tomb. In fact 
parents counsel did not object to said nsychologicals, 
but only requested that she be given opportunity to have 
some input as to the naming of the psychologist should 
Dr. Tomb not complete his existing evaluations. (Record 
at page 11, lines 9-13). 
3. Appellants' Statement of Facts is inadequate 
in that it speaks only of the procedures followed in the 
juvenile court and does not relate sufficient collateral 
information concerning the family circumstances to afford 
a complete understanding of the case in the context of 
terminating parental rights. For this reason respondent 
State of Utah accepts and adopts the Statement of Facts 
set forth in the Brief filed by the Guardian Ad Litem. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE DECISIO:'J 
OF THE JUVENILE COURT TO ORDER THE TERMIN-
ATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS \'liTH REGARL> TO 
ROSE, HAROLD, AND DOLLIE JACKSON. 
A statutory test for termination of parental 
rights is CJ finding "that the parent or parents are unfit 
-3-
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or incompet~nt by reason of conduct or condition · senously 
detrimental to the child ... " (Section 78-3a-48 (1) (a), U.C.,l 
1953, as amended.) Proof must be by a "preponderance of 
evidence." (State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P.2d 395 
(1970)). 
In the present case the Juvenile Court found: 
(1) That the natural parents are socially 
and emotionally retarded and unable or unwilling to 
stimulate their children psychologically, emotionally, 
or socially, and as a result the children, to their serious 
detriment, are failing to develop properly and are 
exhibiting serious mental disorders. 
(2) That Mr. Jackson has a serious personali~ 
disturbance that renders him unable to cope with the proble~ 
of everyday living. Further, that tests and reports of 
past behavior indicated that he is subject to virtually 
uncontrollable aggressive impulses threatening the childrer 
physical welfare. 
(3) That Mrs. Jackson, a deaf-mute, functions 
on a child-like level and is minimally able to make a 
marginal life adjustment. She is completely lacking in 
parenting skills and is unable to relate to her children 
except as a playmate. 
(4) That HarLl~ ~nd Dollie progressed dcve~p-
mentally only when they were removed from the hoPle of the:. 
-4-
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natural parents and given treatment at the Children's 
Center. 
(5) That Rose and Carol, though entitled to some 
limited contact with their natural parents, could not 
receive proper training at home. 
Testimony indicated that the Division of Family 
Services had made efforts to teach Mr. and Mrs. Jackson 
basic parenting skills, but because of their own personality 
disorders they were unable to implement such teachings; 
expert witnesses testified it was doubtful that there 
would ever be improvement in their parenting roles. 
(R. 31-32, 116-118). 
The record is replete with evidence of parental 
unfitness and the nexus betlveen the parents' unfitness 
and the serious personality disorders of their child. 
For example, Cyril Heisner testified concerning a home 
visit where he observed Carol performing "very inappro-
priate attention-getting behavior to attract ... boys' 
attention." Mr. Weisner stated: 
I talked very specifically with Marvin--
this was the kind of limit setting I was 
talking to him about .... [H)e needed to 
deal with this, and I got down to the point 
of offering ... suggestions, talk to he7, get 
her attention, do soMething, and Harvln, 
as he would do time and time again across 
these fifteen months v1ould not and agreed 
that I have a good idea and probably s?me-
thing like that ought to be done, ~ut lt 
seemed like he was paralyzed. He JUSt 
-5-
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could not act and did not act through the 
whole visit to interfere, restrain set a 
limit on, in any way modify the be~avior 
of Carol. [As to Ruby] though s!1owing 
some very giggly laughy affect herself 
again, [she] did not intervene to in any-
way modify w!1at was going on and I got 
the definite impression she was at that 
moment relating to the situation as a 
fifteen-year-old. 
And of course, we can generalize from 
that tremendous concerns here it tells 
me and confirms fears I've had for a long 
time that the--number one, Marvin, I think 
--well, both parents want, I think, certainly 
Ruby, to have their children and to do what's 
correct by them, but they're not able to. 
Marvin was paralyzed in that situation. He 
was unable to react even with my very direct 
kinds of promptings. Ruby was so in touch 
with the situation, and I suppose experiencing 
what Carol was doing vicariously to the extent 
that her affect was right down on Carol's 
level, and I got the idea that we had two 
fifteen-year-olds at the moment, laughing 
and giggling and doing those things. 
(R. p. 70-71). 
Although it is true that termination of parental 
rights is an extreme example of state intervention in 
family life, the facts of the present case show that the 
statutory requirements for such action have been met and 
that the welfare of the Jackson children involved herein 
requires that they be removed permanently from a home 
that cannot contribute to their development in any way. 
This Court has developed certain tests or guideL 
to determine the legal sufficiency of a termination order. 
In the case of In re the Interest of \\linger, 558 P. 2d l)l 
(1976), the court adopted with aprroval the test enunciate 
-6-
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in an Oregon case under an identical termination statute, 
to the effect that a termination order must be supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence to the effect that (1) 
the parent is presently unable to supply physical and 
emotional care for the child and that (2) this condition 
will probably continue for time enough to render the 
integration of the child into a suitable family improbable. 
(Ibid.) In the case of State in the Interest of Walter B., 
577 P.2d 119 (1978), this court held that to sustain a 
termination the characteristics ascribed to the mother 
must represent such a substantial departure from the norm 
as to constitute a condition seriously detrimental to the 
child. In the case of State in the Interest of E.B., 
578 P.2d 831 (1978), the court stated that as a condition 
to termination a parent must be advised of appropriate 
remedial action, and that it must be clearly manifested 
that the home cannot or will not correct the deficiencies 
which exist there. 
The ultimate and most important test in applying 
the statutory standard must be the interest and welfare of 
the child, which concern must outweigh any right or privilege 
of the natural parent. In the case of State v. Dade, 14 Utah 
2d 47, 376 P.2d 948 (1962), this court stated: 
-7-
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"Quite beyond and 111ore imoortant than the 
rights and privileges of the parents is 
the welfare of these children~ and their 
prospects for becoming well-adjusted, self-
sustaining individuals. This is the con-
sideration of paramount importance." 
(376 P. 2d at pg. 949). 
In the termination case of In re Interest of Jennings, 432 
P.2d at pg. 879 (1967), this court stated: 
"While ordinarily the parents have a right 
to the custody of their children, the State 
also has an interest in the welfare of 
children, which is 9aramount thereto." 
In the termination case of State in the Interest of A, 514 
P.2d at pg. 799 (1973), this court stated: 
"While one feels deeply for a parent who 
is deprived of a child that feeling must 
not overcome the duty placed upon the 
courts to act in the best interest of the 
child." 
In the termination case of In re Interest of Winger, (Supri 
at pg. 1313, 1976), this court stated: 
"There is a presumption of great strength, 
that it is in the best interests of the child 
to be reared by its natural parents. This 
presumption is only overcoMe when the trier 
of facts is convinced by a preponderance of 
the evidence the welfare of the child requir~ 
termination." 
And in the termination case of In re the Interest of S.J~ 
H.J. and S.J., 576 P.2d 1280 (1978), this court stated: 
"It was also fair and reasonable to further 
conclude that the rights of the parents were 
secondary in importance since they were in 
direct conflict with and contrary to the 
best interest of the children." 
-8-
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Applying these tests and guidelines in the instant 
case results in the following analogy: 
The parents are unfit or incompetent by reason 
of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the children 
because 
1. They are presently unable to supply physical 
and emotional care for the children. 
2. This circumstance will probably continue 
beyond the time in \vhich these children could otherwise 
be integrated into a suitable substitute home. 
3. The conduct and condition of the parents 
is a substantial departure from normal parental relation-
ships. 
4. The parents have been advised of their 
inadequacies and advised of appropriate remedial action, 
but no change in the circumstances has taken place. 
5. The preponderance of the evidence dictates 
that it is in the best interests of the children to 
terminate the parental relationshin. 
-9-
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POINT II 
TES'T'IMO~JY CONCERNING PSYCHIA'CRTC ll~lD 
0 S1 tlOLOGICAL E; _, INATl ~S lvr, PR! ERLY 
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT. 
Appellants argue t'l.at they had no notice concerni 
a hearing prior to the ordering of psychiatric or psycholos., 
examinations. It is true that Section 78-3a-23, U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended), provides that there shall be "due noti: 
and a hearing set for the specific purpose" when the Court 
finds that the parents' "physical, mental, or emotional 
condition may be a factor in causing the neglect, depen~m 
or deliquency of the child." The facts of this case make 
it clear that the parents did have notice of the request 
for psychological testing and that they were not denied 
a hearing relating thereto. 
The State requested psychological examinations 
at a hearing on Harch 8, 1977. The petition bringing 
the termination matter before the Court specifically 
alleged that the parents' emotional condition was a factor 
underlying the request for permanent deprivation of 
parental rights. An objection was made by Jonathan Ki~, 
counsel for one of the Jackson children, based on a bel~' 
that the parents had alraedy been tested in connection w~ 
a psychological examination of one of their sons. (R-4) · 
A final decision reqardin(T the testinq waco oostponed untL 
the pre-trial hearing on t1arch 17, 1977, when i:l!JPf'llants 
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were represented by Patricia Derlichele. After discussing 
the desirability of having any tests already begun completed 
for continuity's sake, counsel stated: 
"Your Honor, the only thing that I would 
request at this point is, if it is not 
going to be Doctor Tomb and it's determined 
that he can't or won't--doesn't feel 
comfortable following through, that I 
be able to have some input as to who is 
ultimately determined to be the ... 
(R.- ll.) 
That counsel did have input into the testing process 
is shown by State Exhibit #1, psychological evaluation. The 
following appears at page 183 of the record. 
" ... Patty DeMichele of Legal Services represents 
the parents. Because permanent rather than 
temporary deprivations of parental rights is 
in question, Ms. DeMichele expressed the condition 
that both parents be seen by two examiners. 
Repeating essentially the same test battery with 
no reasonable time interval was considered as 
invalidating the evaluation process. Instead, 
Ms. DeMichele agreed to another procedure; 
William H. Brown, a Ph.D. Clinical Psychologist 
was the other examiner. He conducted the testing 
with Mrs. Jackson and the bulk of the post-testing 
interview. He then made his test data available 
to this examiner ['-1alcolm L. Liebroder, Ph. D.) 
who had also been present during Dr. Brown's 
interview of Mrs. Jackson. The procedure was 
essentially reversed for Mr. Jackson. Each 
examiner independently prepared reports of their 
evaluation for each of these parents." (Emphasis 
added). 
Not only were appellants fully represented by 
counsel in the selection of an appropriate and fair testing 
pr0-'0SS, but there was n~ objection to the adequacy of notice 
-11-
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or to the nature of the hearing at '.vhich the order regard 1, 
psychological exams was made. Further, there was no objec~. 
to the order itself or, as discusscu in Point III of the 
Brief of the Guardian Ad Litem, to the testimony of the 
two court-appointed examiners, Dr. Liebroder and Dr. 
Berens en. Inasmuch as Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidenc' 
requires a timely objection on the record to evidence 
claimed to be erroneously admitted, appellants may not 
now seek a reversal of the judgment based on the testimony 
of Dr. Liebroder and Dr. Berensen. 
Respondent State of Utah would argue that the 
hearing requirements were met where the order for psychoW 
cal testing, vital to the determination of the issue be fort 
the Court, was nade in a formal hearing setting where the 
parents were represented bv com~etent counsel. Whether 
or not the hearing could be described as having been 
"set for the specific purpose" would not appear to centro: 
the validity of the hearing. It is clear from the reco~ 
that the due process rights of appellants were fully 
protected. The parents had notice of the hearings where 
psychological examinations were discussed. They were 
represented by counsel at the March 17th hearing where 
the State made a specific motion to have such tests perfo:· 
(R. ll.) Nu '·biection IVil.S made to that rntion Lly couns.ol 
for appellants. 
-12-
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Should the court find that there was not 
compliance with the specific language of Section 78-3a-23, 
U.C.A. (1953, as amended), the order of the Juvenile 
Court based on evidence ste~~ing from the psychological 
examination should nevertheless by upheld. Rule 61 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure SU?ports this position. 
It states: 
Harmless Error. No error in either the 
admission or the exclusion of evidence, and 
no error or defect in any ruling or order or 
in anything done or admitted by the Court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting 
a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment 
or order, unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the Court inconsistent with sub-
stantial justice. The Court at every stage 
of the proceeding must disregard any error of 
defect in the proceeding which does not effect 
the substantial rights of the parties. 
In the present case there is amply uncontradicted 
evidence as to the unfitness of appellants to fulfill the 
parenting role. Sources of such evidence include observation 
of interaction in the home and observation and testing of 
the emotionally disturbed children, in addition to psycho-
logical tests taken voluntarily by parents who, though unable 
to function as parents, have been shown to possess sufficient 
intelligence to understand the nature of the oroceedings 
in t!1c present case. 
In Thatcher v. Merriam, 121 U. 191, 240 P.2d 266 
(19'>2), this court held that an error, even if conceded, 
-13-
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was harmless \vhere ample evidence, other than that of a 
witness claimed to be disqualified, was sufficient to 
support the court's decision. In the instant case, 
although the psychological tests clearly describe the nate: 
of appellants' disabilities, testimony of all the witnesse: 
convincingly pointed to their serious parenting failures. 
Appellants have not shown that the action of t~ 
Juvenile Court was inconsistent with substantial justice 
in this matter, nor have they suggested that given a 
"hearing set for the specific purpose" of considering 
evidence concerning the need for psychological testing of 
appellants, there would have been a different result from 
that reached by the Juvenile Court. 
This Court should likewise reject appellants' 
arguMent that the order perManently depriving them of 
their children should be vacated because of alleged defec> 
in the procedure for obtaining psychological exa'ilinations. 
POINT III 
THE ORDE~ OF ":'HE JUVE:~liL:S COURT TE:'c'HNATING 
PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO ROSE, BUT PERMITTING 
CONTINUING CON':'ACT vJITH HER '<ATURAL PAI\ENTS 
AS SHE DESIRES, WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE 
COURT'S EQUITABLE PO\'.'ET{S AND SHOULD NOT BE 
OVERTU!<tlED. 
As this court has stated, "the [juvenile] court 
1 · lat i tute i1 ,d discrctior. is given hroad and com!ore.1ens1ve 
-14-
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determining the custody of the child .... " (Deveraux v. 
Brown, 2 Utah 2d 334, 336, 273 P.2d 185, 196 (1954)). The 
legislature has recognized this principle in enacting 
Section 78-3a-39, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), which sets 
outs in 19 subsections a variety of dispositions which 
may be made by juvenile court order. Subsection 17 states: 
"The court may make any other reasonable orders ~;hich are 
for the best interest of the child .... " 
The following statement of this court in State 
v. Dade, 376 P.2d at paqe 951 (1962) 
supports the disposition made by the juvenile court in 
the present case: 
It is appropriate to observe that this 
proceeding, which has such a vi tal and 
permanent effect on the lives of those 
concerned, is not adversary in the 
usual sense, but is an inquiry into the 
welfare of the children; and is therefore 
equitable in tre highest degree. Due to 
this fact and to the somewhat informal 
manner in which such proceedings are 
conducted, the Juvenile Court has even 
more than the usual advantages in 
judging the credibility of the witnesses, 
the personalities of the persons involved, 
and the correct solution to the problems 
confronted. For these reasons, and also 
because that court is staffed with judges 
and personnel who have special training, 
experience and interest in this field, 
and who are devoting their exclusive 
attention to such matters, it is proper to 
allows that court a wide latitude of discretion 
as to the judgment arrived at. According~y 
it is the well established rule that we Wlll 
not disturb the findings and determinations made 
-15-
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unless they are clearly against the weight of 
the evidence, or it is plainly manifest that 
the court has abused its discretion. 
In the instant case there was much evidence ~c 
it would be in the best interest of Rose to remove her 
permanently from her parents' home. Her school teacher 
testified that while living at home Rose was usually 
dirty, wore old, ill-fitting clothes, was unable to form 
relationships with her peers, and was usually depressed, 
although she was a bright child who could do good work. 
(R. 104-109). Dr. Claudia Berense~, while recognizing 
Rose's personality strengths and resiliency, recommended 
that Rose not be returned to a home where the parents are 
not "able to ~rovide a nurturing, even minimally adequa~ 
environment ... " (R. 132). Dr. Berensen recommended 
a termination of parental rights but added that she felt 
it would be important for Rose to see her natural parents 
"when she felt the need." [R. 133). Rose, at 8 1/2 years 
old, was described as an adoptable, socially skillful 
child, whose parents could not care for her. 
The judgment of the court in this matter was 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence before it. 
It is true that it is unusual to preserve the right of 
contact with natural parents in a termination order, 
but given t:he c_:ourt's equitable povn"r" ancl the rule thJt 
the best interest of the child must bt> served, the order 
in the~ instant case is valid and shonlc1 be u;Jllrl cl. 
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POIN'i' IV 
THE OR::JER TERC1I11JATING APPEL!..ANTS' PAS-ENTAL 
RIGHTS AS TO HAROLD AND DOLLIE JACKSON AND 
PLACING THE:1 n; CUSTODY OF TH;<; UTAH STATE 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES FOR PLACEHENT 
I~l 1\!-l ADOPTIVE HOME \•/AS SUPPORTED BY A 
PREPON~E~NCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD 
NOT BE l10DIFIED '10 AFFO'.<.D THE APPELLANTS 
VISITATION RIGHTS. 
Harold and Dollie are young children who have 
not lived in the hor:1e of their natural parents for many 
nonths. As set out in Point I, the evidence fully supports 
the termination of parental rights with regard to these 
children, and the Juvenile Court found from the evidence 
that they are adoptable and without strong ties to their 
parents. Counsel for appellants elicited the following 
response from Cyril Weisner, a parent therapist with the 
Children's Center, v1hen she asked "1'/hat kind of emotional 
bonds [Harold and Dollie] had with their parents?"" 
This is again, a tough one for r:1e to relat2 
to, but my most solid feeling about this is 
that these two young children, if they have 
a relationshio with these two individuals, 
it's alr:1o~t- although again, it's a child to 
child thing, that it's a-- they may be 
bigger kinds [sic] It's kind of hard in 
those ways to go into the mind of a small child 
of course, but I don't think there is a 
tremendously strong parent-certainly not in 
the areas we would expect at this age, because 
there has been little stir:1ulation, Harold and 
Dollie both have been allowed to >vithdraw 
time and time again and limits have virtually 
not been set in any way, so I don't think there's 
anythinq there and especially looking at it 
frop 1 the stzmdcJoint of what I think would be 
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best for. those t\vo children, llurold and Dollie 
I'm talk1ng about. There is nothing there in 
the wily of a bond that I would be tremendous~ 
afraid to disrupt. 
The facts of the present case support a terminM 
of appellants' parental rights concerning Harold and DolL· 
Sue!! termination in the case of these b-10 children correct 
applies to "all the rights and duties, including residual 
parental rights and duties, of the ... parents involved." 
(Section 73-3a-48(3), U.C . .I\. (1953, as al:'ended)), and 
is clearly within the power of the Juvenile Court to so 
order. (See Point III.) 
POIN~ V 
THE MINOR CHILDRE~ HAVE A CONSTITUTIO'mLLY 
PROTECTED RIGHT TO 'i'HE PHESERVATIO:--J OF 
THEIR BEST INTERESTS. 
In the case of State in the Interest of A, 
supra, this court, after sustaining the termination 
of parental rights regarding three minor children si~ilar 
in ages to the minor children involved in the instant ~~ 
suggested that the children should be placed in a proper 
adoptive home " ... where they can feel that they belong 
to a family group." (514 P. 2d at BOO). 
It is obvious in the instant case that if the 
appellants' parental rights ure perpetuated the minor 
children will spend their remuining growinq up years 
in foster care, possibly tr,msfcl-rcc to u. succession 
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of surrogate foster parents, without any perr.1anent familial 
ties. Many of the courts of this land have held that such 
a circumstance is unconstitutional, that a child has a 
"liberty" right to the protection of his best interest, 
free from any narental possessory claim. 
In the case of In re Roy, 393 !LY.S.2d 515, (1977) 
the Family Court for New York City held that a natural 
mother's possessory claim to a 16 year old son who had 
lived with foster parents since one year old should be 
severed in the best interest of the child. The court 
stated: 
"For this court to refuse to consider the 
child's best interest because of an adult's 
title to him, albeit a biological parent's, 
seemingly would be unconstitutaionl. To pre-
clude a oerson bv virtue of his birth from 
a benefit - from~ a measure promoting his 
interest - would be an anomaly in constitu-
tional law .... The minor has an unequivocal 
and unquestionable interest in termination 
of his~parent's title to him, and therefore 
he seemingly has a constitutional right to 
freedom from the parental possessory claim." 
The integration of a child into a viable family 
unit is more important to the child than maintaining a 
non-custodial natural parent-child relationship. In the 
case of State v. Blum, (Or. App. 1970), 463 P.2d 367, 
which was cited with approval by this court in the case 
of In rc \vinger, supra, the Oregon Appeals Court, under a 
dq•ci /at ion statute identical to ours, affin'led an order 
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that parental rights of a mentally ill mother could be 
terminated upon finding that she was unfit by reason 
of a condition seriously detrimental to the child. The 
court stated: 
"It is important that the child have 
a sense of belonging to a family. T'·is 
is one of the things we look for after we 
say that our prime consideration is the best 
interests of the child. It is not in the 
best interest of the child to keep hiw 
forever in a limbo--a limbo that is 
terminated, if at all, when on some 
uncertain date his mentally ill mothec 
recovers and gives him a normal mother's 
care. For this child it may well be 
that at his present age of seven and one-
half years it is already too late to success-
fully integrate him int~ a family. If it 
is not too late, it is important-to get it 
done soon." (463 P. 2d, p. 370). 
The federal courts have placed a name tag on 
this right of a child to the least restrictive familial 
relationship. In the case of Organization of Foster 
Families v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277(1976), certain 
foster parents attempted to restrain the New York City 
Human Resources Administration from transferring foster 
children without affording a constitutionally appropria~ 
fair hearing, claiming that both the foster children and 
the foster parents enjoyed a familial right of privacy 
similar to that recognized in a biological family relat~ 
ship because of the psychological ties v1hich had bee:-~ 
-20-
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formed, which was protected under both the Equal 
Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Federal District Court agreed with the 
foster parents that the pre-removal procedures employed 
by the New York agency were consitutionally defective, 
recognizing in the process that the minor children had 
a constitutionally protected "liberty interest to familial 
privacy " ; viz., a consitutional right to the preservation 
of the least restrictive familial relationship which can _ 
not be deprived without due urocess. The court disagreed 
with the intervening natural parent's contention that a 
hearing is superfluous when a foster child is to be returned 
to its biological parents,holding that if the evidence 
discloses that, despite the diligent efforts of the agency, 
the biological parent has failed for more than a year to 
maintain substantial and continuious contact with a child 
in foster care, permanent neglect proceedings may be 
instituted and the biological parent's presumptive rights 
to custody may be forfeited. (418 F. Supp. 277 at page 
283). On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the 
Supreme Court reversed the District Court on the basis 
that the New York pre-removal procedures did meet due 
process requirements. Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Fami1iEC~, 431 U.S. 816, 87 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 
(1977). Limiting its decision to this narrow ground the 
-21-
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Supreme Court did not affirm head on whether or not a 
child has a "liberty interest to familial privacy." 
The Supreme Court did recognize, however, that "the 
il'lportance of the familial relationship to the individuals 
involved stems from the emotional attachments that deri~ 
from the intimacy of daily association, and from the ro~ 
it plays in promoting a way of life through the instruct~ 
of chilcren, as well as from the fact of blood relsionship. 
(97 S.Ct. at page 2110) Further the court recognized 
that " ... emotional ties betlveen foster parent and foster 
child are in many cases quite close, and undoubtedly in 
some as close as those existing in biological families.' 
(97 S.Ct., footnote 52 at page 2110). 
In the instant case there is no question of d~ 
process in regard the termination procedures which have 
been followed, nor is there a custody contest involved 
between natural and foster parents. The right of a child 
to have a secure and adequate family relationship in whid 
he can develop to his fullest potential is, however, 
similarly involved. In this regard we think the follm1> 
language of the Dumpson court is relevant and signigicant: 
"The time has long since passed when children 
were considered mere chattels of t'le adults 
with whol'l they lived. The foster care system 
l tself, initiated ln New York in the latter pac· 
of • ;1e nineteenth century, rerrcsented a large 
teu forward from the prior practice of 
insiitutionalizing children with the poor a~ 
-22-
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feebleminded or boarding them out as 
a~prentices or indentur~d servants. In 
any event, it is by now well-settled that 
children are 'persons' within the meaning 
of ~he Fourteenth Amendment whose rights are 
ent1tled to protection against state abridge-
ment. (Authorities omitted) Foremost among 
those rights, as the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held, is the right to be heard before 
being 'condemned to suffer grievous loss'". 
(Authorities omitted) 418 F. Suoo. at 282 
(Emphasis added). --
There seems to be no question that a continued 
parental relationship between appellants and the minor 
children will be detrimental to the children, even if 
non-custodial. Concern was expressed that Mr. Jackson 
would not be a resource but rather a handicap for the 
children as demonstrated by the fact that everyone of 
his children had severe problems. (R. 25, L. 18). Mrs. 
Jackson has real difficulty in functioning as an adequate 
parent, and is neither a positive nor stimulating resource 
for the children. (R. 32, L. 1). Even with outside 
resources and help it is doubtful that the parents can 
be helpful or any kind of a resource for the children. 
(R. 37-38). Mr. Jackson can afford no love and affection 
for the children and though Mrs. Jackson cares she can't 
do much for them. (R. 37, L. 10). There \vas a marked 
improvement in the basic skills and performance of the 
children after receiving special care outside the 
ho!'IC'. (R. 44, L. 19). On being returned home from foster 
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care, Harold's speech regressed, be beca~e isolated, 
his drooling increased, his bed wetting resumed, his 
toiletting ability regressed and his I.Q. decreased. 
(R. 52-53). While residing at home Dollie was unkempt, 
improperly clothed and had a general apathy completely 
uncharacteristic for a little girl of 2 years old. (R. 
79, L. 29). She received no stimulation in the home. 
(R. 42, L. 18). 
One clinical psychologist testified that Mr. 
Jackson actually didn't want the children, didn't even 
want his marriage. (R. 32, L.21). A psychiatrist testifie. 
that Mr. Jackson had only a minimal interest in looking 
at the particulars of his children as a parent. (R. lH, 
L. 23). Mrs. Jackson wants her children with her, but on 
the c~ild-like basis of a 15 year old having playmates. 
(R. 72, L. 3). After clinical assistance over a period 
of almost a year there was no significant improvement 
in the ability of the parents to stimulate or discipline 
the children. (R. 72, L. 4). A well qualified psychologis' 
testified that long term foster care was not the answer 
for the family difficulties and in fact would be harmful 
and detrinental. (R. 56, L. 14). 
The continuation of a parental relationshio 
betwee apr~cllcnt;" a:1d th<· '., i ldren involved in this ap~e 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
will condemn said children to suffer a grievous loss in 
relation to their right to a non-limiting familial relation-
ship. Continuation of foster relationships which effectively 
keep these children in limbo and deny them a permanent 
family relationship would not be in their best interest. 
Termination of parental rights, and setting these children 
free for permanent adoptive relationships before it is too 
late, would be the lest restrictive alternative regarding 
the "liberty" rights of these children, and consistent 
with the expressed legislative intent of this State. 
(Section 78-3a-9(19), U.C.A., 1953, Replacement Volume 
9A). 
CONCLL'SIO'l 
The order of the Juvenile Court to terminate the 
parental rights of the appellantF' herein was based on 
evidence that appellants, because of severe personality 
and emotional disorders, are unable to provide for the 
basic developmental needs of their children. Evidence 
further indicated that outside assistance or training 
given the parents did not and would not result in any 
improvement in their parenting abilities. Psychiatric 
and psychological examination of the parents, carried out 
pursuant to court order without objection by appellants, 
were properly considered by the court in determining the 
annropriate disposition of this matter. 
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Although the three younger chi ldrcn of appellant, 
(Rose, Harold, and Dollie) are all considered adoptable, 
expert testimony ners\1adei1 the r0urt that it was in the 
best interests of Rose, a child who exhibited unexpected 
personality strengths and certain ties to her parents, 
to be allowed contacts with her natural parents subsequent 
to the termination of the parent-child relationshi9. Such 
a provision in the order of the Juvenile Court is an 
acceptable exercise of the board discretionary powers vest-
in the court in juvenile natters. The court found that 
inasnuch as no emotional bond existed between Harold and 
Dollie and their parents, complete termination of parentac 
rights was in the best interest of these children. 
Recognizing the extreme need of three children 
for a hone that can meet their psychological a:1d social 
needs and save them from a future as emotionally 
deprived and anti-social adults, respondent State of 
Utah seeks the affirmance of the order of the Juvenile 
Court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
R0!3ER'l' B. HA:'JSE:-J 
Attorney General 
PATRICIA S. ALLRED 
FRAil::\LY"l B. >11\T!IESOH 
Assistant Attorneys G~neral 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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